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ABSTRACT
Source location privacy (SLP) is becoming an important
property for a large class of security-critical wireless sensor
network applications such as monitoring and tracking. Much
of the previous work on SLP have focused on the development
of various protocols to enhance the level of SLP imparted
to the network, under various attacker models and other
conditions. Others works have focused on analysing the level
of SLP being imparted by a specific protocol.
In this paper, we focus on deconstructing routing-based
SLP protocols to enable a better understanding of their
structure. We argue that the SLP-aware routing protocols
can be classified into two main categories, namely (i) spatial
and (ii) temporal. Based on this, we show that there are
three important components, namely (i) decoy selection, (ii)
use and routing of control messages and (iii) use and routing
of decoy messages. The decoy selection technique imparts the
spatial or temporal property of SLP-aware routing. We show
the viability of the framework through the construction of
well-known SLP-aware routing protocols using the identified
components.
CCS Concepts
•Networks→ Sensor networks; Network privacy and
anonymity; •Security and privacy → Mobile and wire-
less security;
Keywords
Source Location Privacy, Wireless Sensor Networks, Routing,
Decomposition, Components, Spatial, Temporal.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) to support novel monitoring and tracking applica-
tions, source location privacy (SLP) is becoming an important
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property that needs to be guaranteed by the WSN. However,
providing SLP in wireless sensor networks presents a difficult
challenge due to their potential to expose important infor-
mation about the environment that they exist in, due to the
broadcast nature of wireless communications. As messages
are broadcasted, they can be eavesdropped by a malicious
attacker. Even if encryption is used to protect the content
of a message the context of the broadcast is still exposed for
a malicious eavesdropper to take advantage of. In the case
of SLP, the context that needs to be kept confidential is the
location of the source node, which is closely related to the
actual location of a physical asset. SLP is important in, for
example, military applications, where locations of military
personnel need to be kept secret.
SLP was initially introduced in terms of the panda-hunter
game [16] where a WSN has been deployed across a large
area to monitor pandas in their natural habitat. Using a
directional antenna, it was shown that an attacker could
identify the location of the immediate source of a message
and, using this information, trace messages back through
the system and find the ultimate source of the messages and
thus the panda (or other asset). SLP protection schemes
aim to protect against this scenario though various tech-
niques. Many techniques centre around increasing the time
an attacker would take to capture the source by altering the
routing protocol.
There has been much work on routing-based SLP [3, 18],
with many new techniques having been developed, and with
the performance typically being evaluated through large-
scale simulations. There are also several works that have
developed models to analyse the privacy provided by their
technique or protocol. However, these models tend to be
specific to the type or nature of the technique. However, since
most of the work on SLP have focused on altering the basic
routing protocols to provide SLP, the focus of this paper is to
identify whether there exists a basis set of components that
support such protocol transformation. Such deconstruction
will enable to (i) develop more efficient routing-based SLP
protocols by refining specific components, (ii) create a formal
model of each component and reason about the correctness
of the overall protocol and (iii) provide a basis for comparing
various SLP-aware routing protocols.
To this end, the contributions of this paper are:
• We argue that there exists two types of SLP-aware
routing protocols for WSNs, namely (i) spatial and (ii)
temporal.
• We provide three components, namely (i) decoy selec-
tion, (ii) use and routing of control messages and (iii)
use and routing of decoy messages, that make the ba-
sis of an SLP-aware routing protocol, over the basic
routing protocol for application messages.
• Through a series of examples of well-known SLP-aware
routing protocols, we show how these protocols can be
constructed using our proposed components, showing
the viability of our framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2
we review some related work focusing on the relevant routing
protocols. Section 3 contains the models we use and assume
in this work. The deconstruction of the routing-based SLP al-
gorithm is performed in Section 4 and examples are provided
in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2. RELATEDWORK
Since the seminal work [16] there have been a variety of
techniques developed to provide SLP in different situations
against attackers of varying strengths [3, 9]. As this work
focuses on exploring providing SLP at the routing layer, we
will first provide a review of routing solutions before covering
techniques that fall outside this area.
Phantom Routing, introduced in the seminal work, is a
two-stage SLP protocol where (i) a directed random walk
is performed away from the source to a phantom node and
then, (ii) the phantom node routes the application message
to the sink. The phantom node is the diversionary node an
attacker should be lured to before the source, increasing the
time-to-capture. It was initially defined with two variants,
one where the second stage uses flooding [16] and another
where the second stage uses single-path routing to reach the
sink [8]. However, there have been many variations since
such as GROW [24] which uses a bloom filter to prevent the
walk doubling back on itself, techniques that allocate the
phantom node in a specific area whilst avoiding direction
information leakage [11] and angle-based techniques [21, 23]
which calculate angles between certain nodes to influence the
direction of the walk. Other techniques have adapted the
random walk such that it forms a ring around the source and
messages are routed through the ring before being forwarded
onwards to the source [10, 25].
Another technique has been to use fake sources, which are
nodes in the network that broadcast messages encrypted and
padded to be indistinguishable from normal messages from
the source. Fake source techniques aim to provide SLP by
generating fake messages that lead to attackers being lured
towards the fake source rather than the real source. There
have been several implementations [6, 7, 8, 22] with the selec-
tion of the location of fake sources and the parametrisation
having important impacts on the performance of the tech-
niques. Recent work has focused on dynamically determine
good parameters to use online [2]. A criticism of fake source
is that they tend to be more energy intensive compared to
other routing-based approaches.
Other techniques consist of a hybrid between generating
fake messages and having messages modify their routing path.
One example is tree-based diversionary routing [12] which
imposes a tree structure on the network and then routes fake
messages through the tree. The idea of fogs or clouds [4, 13]
is also similar where a normal message is routed round a
group of nodes called a fog and then onwards to other fogs.
Fake messages are also used to provide additional privacy.
Other techniques to provide SLP against local attackers
include using space in MAC beacon frames to disseminate
messages from the source to other areas in the network before
being routed to the sink [19].
Privacy against attackers with a global view of the network
tends to be very different to defending against attackers with
a local view. Periodic is one such algorithm that provides
global SLP by having all nodes broadcast periodically, even
if there is no protocol message to send [14]. Improvements
have been made to this kind of technique by a variety of
methods such as; sending messages according to a statistical
model [20], optimisations based on clustering [15] and other
traffic decorrelation techniques [17].
Of the most interesting to this work is the routing-based
technique called Source Simulation [14], where optimal global
SLP is traded in for improvements in energy efficiency. This
is done by creating traces though the network that mimic
the movement of real sources.
3. SYSTEMMODEL
In this section, we present the models we assume in this
paper.
3.1 Network Model
A wireless sensor node is a device with a unique identifier
that has limited computational capabilities and is equipped
with a radio transmitter for communication. A WSN is a set
of wireless sensor nodes with communication links between
pairs of nodes. We consider a sensor network to be a graph
G = (V,E) where V represents the set of nodes and E the
set of links between the nodes. When a link exists between
two nodes m,n, then m and n can directly communicate
with each other and are called neighbours.
There exists a distinguished node in the network called
a sink, which is responsible for collecting data and which
acts as a link between the WSN and the external world.
Other nodes sense data and then route the data attached
to protocol messages along a computed route to the sink for
collection. We assume that any node can be a data source.
We assume that the network is event-triggered, i.e., when a
node senses an object, it starts sending messages periodically
to the sink for a certain amount of time.
We assume the messages sent are encrypted and that the
source node(s) includes its ID in the encrypted messages.
Using the ID, the sink can infer an asset’s location as we
assume the network administrators will record where they
put nodes. We do not assume that WSN nodes have access
to GPS due to the resulting increase in energy cost. The type
of encryption, be it end-to-end or pairwise is left undefined.
3.2 Privacy Model
The overall objective of any WSN-based SLP solution is to
ensure that the asset (at a given location) is never captured
through information leaked by the WSN. However, we make
two observations:
1. If the asset is static, then the attacker can perform an
exhaustive search of the network to find the asset. In
this case, the SLP problem becomes irrelevant. Specif-
ically, if there exists no time bound on the capture
time, then an exhaustive search is a trivial solution, yet
effective solution.
2. On the other hand, if the asset is mobile, then perform-
ing an exhaustive search of the network is unsuitable,
as the attacker may hone in on a given location only to
find out that the asset has moved. Thus, the SLP prob-
lem can only be considered when it is time-bounded,
capturing the maximum amount of time there mobile
asset will spend at a given location.
This notion of time bound has been termed as safety period
in the literature. There are two alternative definitions of
safety period: The first, used primarily by routing-based
techniques, e.g. [8], is where the safety period is defined as
the time required to capture the asset. The aim of these
techniques is to maximise the safety period, i.e., the higher
the time to capture, the higher the SLP level provided.
The second notion of safety period is used where it is de-
sirable to bound the amount of time SLP is being considered
for, i.e., if an attacker fails to capture a source within the
specified safety period, then we say SLP has been provided.
That notion of safety period intuitively captures the maxi-
mum time an asset will be at a given location before its next
movement. Often, this can be obtained from previous data
gathering to know more about such mobile assets.
This second notion of safety period is more generic that
the first one in that, rather than attempting to maximise
the amount of time an asset isn’t captured (as under the
first definition), the second definition captures the fact that
the asset can’t be reached before a certain time limit, i.e.,
setting the time limit to be ∞ in the second instance results
in the first definition.
Thus, in this paper, we use the time bound model of safety
period.
3.3 Attacker Model
It was shown in [1] that the strength of a WSN attacker can
be factored along two dimensions, namely (i) presence and
(ii) actions. Presence may, for example, be local while actions
can be eavesdropping, crash or reprogramming among others.
In this paper, we assume a distributed eavesdropper attacker.
We chose a distributed attacker as the attacker can move
around the network, gathering further information and the
only action that he can perform is eavesdropping. Though
being a weak attacker model, an attacker with a stronger
set of actions will likely interfere with its stated objective of
capturing the asset. For example, if the attacker attempts
to jam signals at a given location, then the attacker cannot
progress within the network to reach the asset within the
specified safety period.
We assume the distributed eavesdropper to be initially
located at the sink, since he is guaranteed to detect the
arrival of a message at that location. Wherever the attacker
is located, upon receiving (i.e., overhearing) the first new
message at that location, the attacker moves to the neighbour
who relayed the message. The reason to focus on the first
new message is that the message has, with high probability,
travelled along the shortest path from the source to the sink.
To achieve this, we assume that the attacker has sufficient
capabilities to determine the direction in which he receives
the message, although the range of its detection is assumed
to be limited and does not extend to the entire network.
Thus, when the attacker hears a new message, it makes a
step towards the source. This process can be repeated a
number of times until the attacker reaches the source node,
whereby it captures the asset. Such a routing protocol that
provides little protection to the source location is called a
protectionless routing protocol.
4. DECONSTRUCTING SLP-AWAREROUT-
ING PROTOCOLS
In this section, we explain the main components required in
transforming a routing protocol for wireless sensor networks
into one which is SLP-aware.
The problem of developing a SLP-aware routing protocol
for WSN is that the routing protocol needs to satisfy two
requirements: (i) data from sensor nodes need to be routed
to the sink - this type of routing is called convergecast, and
(ii) an eavesdropping attacker cannot trace the source within
the safety period. The first requirement rules out trivial
routing protocols that are not convergecast while the second
one requires the routing protocol to enforce SLP. A typical
approach has been to transform the original convergecast
routing protocol, denoted by R, into an SLP-aware one,
denoted by Rs. Invariably, to mask the actual location of the
source at the routing level, the network traffic is re-engineered
such that the attacker is delayed on its way to the source.
The delay is proportional to the safety period.
There are two ways in which this delay can be imparted: (i)
spatially, where the attacker takes a longer path to reach the
source, or (ii) temporally, where the attacker is slowed down
on his path. For the spatial delay, the attacker normally
visits a higher number of nodes than what it would have
under R, while under Rs, the attacker may visit the same
number of nodes but the information required for the attacker
to move is not made readily available. In either case, the
attacker is made to “deterministically” follow a path that he
believes will lead him to the asset within the safety period.
In reality, the SLP-aware routing protocols lead the attacker
down paths that will delay him. On such paths, one or more
nodes with specific roles are known as decoys. Thus, the
main transformation of a normal routing protocol into a
corresponding SLP-aware one is through the use of decoys.
However, several components are required to enable the WSN
to properly use the decoys.
4.1 Component 1: Selection of Decoys
The selection of decoys is an ongoing process while application
messages are being sent to the sink. These decoys have to be
selected in such a way that there is little or no correlation
between the decoys and the actual source, i.e., selecting a
decoy should not indirectly leak the actual location of the
source. To blur any possible relationship, some notion of
probabilistic selection is performed.
Just as there are two ways the delay can be imparted,
there are two ways in which decoys can be selected: (i)
spatially and (ii) temporally. The spatial selection of decoys
is performed in such a way that an attacker continuously
receives messages but is made to go through a longer route.
On the other hand, the temporal solution works in such a
way that, at some point, the attacker does not overhear an
application message over a certain amount of time, thereby
being delayed.
4.2 Component 2: Use of and Routing of Con-
trol Messages
• Spatial selection of decoys: When this selection tech-
nique is chosen, decoys need to be chosen such that they
are adjacent to each other (and further away from the
source) so that they can attempt to lure the attacker
along longer paths in the network. To ensure this,
control information need to be transmitted to enable
nodes to randomly decide if and when to become a de-
coy. Also, this suggests that control information needs
to be carefully routed so that decoys can be selected at
every hop. With this technique, both the convergecast
and the routing of control messages can be done using
different protocols.
• Temporal selection of decoys: When this selection tech-
nique is chosen, the main aim is to deprive the attacker
of application messages from time to time, so as to
delay him. Thus, as opposed to the spatial case, where
subsequent decoys need to be adjacent to each other,
here decoys do not need to, and they can be selected
at various locations. In such a situation, an attacker
may be “deadlock” at a location and may have to wait
a long time before getting the next message. Again,
control messages will need to be routed in such a way
that nodes can randomly decide if and when to become
decoys.
4.3 Component 3: Use of and Routing of De-
coy Messages
• Spatial selection of decoys: With the spatial selection of
decoys, decoys are continuously selected further away
from the source and the decoys need to continuously
receive a send decoy messages so that they lure the
attacker away. So, decoy messages need to be sent and
routed in such a way that increases the chances of the
decoy messages reach an attacker before it gets too close
to the source and also the decoy routing strategy needs
to be such that there is a high likelihood of the attacker
receiving the decoy message. An example of such a
routing protocol with higher reliability is flooding.
• Temporal selection of decoys: With the main aim of
temporal selection of decoys being to deprive attackers
of application messages, the need for decoy messages is
very low. In fact, by starving the attacker of application
messages that it can follow to backtrack to the source,
no decoy messages need to be used (and no routing of
decoy messages is needed).
5. EXAMPLE CASE STUDIES
In this section, we will showcase the generality of our frame-
work by deconstructing three different SLP routing protocols.
The first example will be based on the spatial selection of de-
coys while the second one will focus on the temporal selection
strategy.
5.1 Spatial Selection
Dynamic Fake Sources (DFS) [2] is an SLP-aware routing
protocol that uses a spatial selection of decoys. This selection
is typically performed using control messages1, which fall
1There have been examples of spatial section without control
messages, e.g., in the Short-lived Fake Source strategy [8], a
node chooses to become a fake source with a certain proba-
bility after receiving an application message. However, this
technique performed poorly which gave rise to performing
more intelligent diversionary allocation, that requires the
two kinds of protocol messages.
into two kinds: (i) network information dissemination and
(ii) diversionary node allocation.
The first kind of message spreads network information to
allow nodes to make decisions about whether they should
be fake sources. For example, in the Dynamic Fake Source
algorithm [2], an 〈Away〉 message is flooded from the sink
node. This allows other nodes to determine their distance to
the sink, who their neighbours are and also their neighbour’s
sink distance. The algorithm also places a header in the
protocol messages to disseminate information such as the
distance from the source. This information is then stored
and updated to allow decisions to be made about fake source
selection.
The second kind of control message is used to actually
select a node as a fake source. In [2], when a 〈Choose〉 mes-
sage is received a node becomes a fake source. The recipient
of the 〈Choose〉 message is randomly selected, reducing the
correlation between source and decoy. This selection process
then allows the construction of a diversionary route, as decoy
nodes are adjacent to each other. The type of fake source
(temporary or permanent) is determined based on the infor-
mation received in the information dissemination message,
as are other fake source parameters; such as the fake message
broadcast rate. Once a node has finished being a fake source
the torch is passed to a subsequent node by sending a further
〈Choose〉 message.
Figure 1a shows an illustration of the working of the Dy-
namic Fake Source protocol. Decoys are created such that
the attacker goes on a diversionary route, where the attacker
initially moves towards the source but is then pulled back
away from the source. Other techniques have a similar ap-
proach (i.e., using spatial selection), for example [12] first
creates a tree structure in the network (using dissemination
messages) and then sends requests to the leaves for nodes to
generate and send dummy packets (using selection messages).
5.2 Temporal Selection
In this section, we will construct two SLP routing protocols
that are based on temporal selection of decoys.
5.2.1 Phantom Routing
As mentioned previously, one important factor that needs to
be satisfied for SLP routing is that there should be little or
no correlation between the decoys and the actual source. For
temporal selection, the source can send a control message
prior to sending an application message in a random direction
to a random node, informing it to become a decoy. Then,
the source routes the application to the same node, which
then act as a decoy by starting convergecast. This can be
achieved through a similar route discovery technique, as in
mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). Once a node has become
a decoy, then it will route the application message using the
convergecast routing strategy.
However, such a technique will induce a larger latency in
the data delivery as the application message will incur the
latency of the selection message to reach its destination. An
optimisation of the above technique is, instead, to embed a
“distance” value in the application message, which is subse-
quently sent on a directed random walk away from the source.
At every hop, the distance value is decremented by one. The
node that receives the message is distance 0 becomes a decoy.
Such a routing protocol has been proposed in [8, 16] called
Phantom Routing, which is illustrated in Figure 1b. The
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(a) Dynamic Fake Sources: An example
of spatial selection of decoys [2].
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(b) Phantom routing: An example of tem-
poral selection of decoys [8, 16].
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(c) Tree routing: An example of temporal
delay by alternating which branch the
source node attaches to.
Figure 1: Three example techniques
figure shows the attacker waiting (i.e., looping on itself) for
an application message to arrive before he can move. This
delay prevents the attacker from reaching the source within
the safety period.
So, in this case, component 1 is a temporal selection of
decoys, component 2 being that control information (rather
than control messages) need to be sent to select decoys2.
Further, no routing strategy is needed to route the decoy
messages as the decoys do not need to generate such decoy
messages since the attacker is starved of application messages.
5.2.2 A Tree-based Example
Using the information gained by analysing Phantom Routing
and understanding the protocols through the components,
we can propose a novel temporal SLP-aware routing protocol
that delays the attacker. This technique again attempts to
delay the attacker by changing the path over which messages
are routed. For example, when a spanning tree is overlaid
on top of the network - such as the tree created by the
Collection Tree Protocol (CTP) [5] - source nodes could
alternate between the branches to which it is attached. This
already occurs to some extent in CTP as routes are frequently
changed to divert away from congested or unreliable areas.
By having the node that generates application messages
change between branches each time it sends a message, then
the attacker may end up stuck along one branch for some
time until the branch it is on is chosen again. It can be
shown that this protocol will lead to higher levels of SLP.
So for this scheme, the decoy selection is the selection of
which route to take to the sink, the control messages are
used to setup and maintain the tree, and there are no decoy
messages as the change in path of application messages leads
to the delay. Typically, temporal SLP-aware protocols will
not require decoy messages
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analysed SLP-aware routing protocols
for WSNs and deconstructed these protocols to understand
the main components of such SLP-aware routing protocols.
2Observe that piggybacking of control information is only
an optimisation here.
We have firstly identified the nature of SLP-aware routing
protocols and classified them as spatial or temporal. We then
identified three main components, namely (i) decoy selection,
(ii) use and routing of control messages and (iii) use and
routing of decoy messages. We have subsequently shown
how three protocols, one spatial and two temporal, can be
constructed using the three above components, showing the
viability of the framework.
As future work, we will formalise each component and
then develop correctness proofs for the composition to yield
SLP-aware routing protocols.
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